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Economic Organization Forms beyond Investor Ownership
1. Introduction
As noted by Dow2: “Despite much attention (…) to the organization of 
firms, the question of why large firms are conventionally controlled by 
investors rather than workers has not been high on the economic research 
agenda, perhaps for the same reason that fish do not study water”. That 
is a regrettable neglect, as study of non-investor enterprises may provide 
important insights, especially for scholars interested in economics of 
moderation. Other than worker-owned firms, also supplier-, consumer- 
and non-profit firms belong to this category. Not only do economists 
devote relatively less attention to them than to conventional firms, but they 
also rarely recognize their common characteristics. This article focuses on 
one common characteristic, which is defined as the owner’s concern with 
qualitative aspects of her the firm’s operation.
The workings of, an economic system are necessarily influenced 
by economic analysis that explains and rationalizes it. In my view the 
perceived superiority of inverstor ownership is linked to the overemphasis 
that economists put on efficient financial markets. This, in turn, is a result 
of economic analyses being dominated by mathematical modelling. This 
method requires a  one-dimensional maximand, which I  deem the main 
culprit. I will argue that this quantitative approach obscures a great deal 
of qualitative considerations that should be part of economic decisions. 
Consequently, inverstor ownership, especially when intermediated 
by financial markets, results in economic decisions oblivious to these 
qualitative considerations. Therefore, it is interesting to look at economic 
decisions made by non-investor-owned firms.
This paper is structured as follows: first I make an argument that excess 
is a consequence of subordination of economic activity to financial profit, 
1  Mgr Justyna Szambelan, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w  Warszawie, al. Niepod- 
ległości 164, 02-554 Warszawa.
2  G. K. Dow, Governing the rm: workers’ control in theory and practice, Cambridge 
University Press, New York 2003, p. 2.
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sought by investor-owners. Second, I examine existing justifications for the 
investor ownership. Third, I conceptualize non-investor owned enterprise. 
Finally, I review evidence on non-investor owned enterprises that indicates 
their relevance for the economy of moderation.
2. Investor ownership as the cause of excess
The classic consumer theory treats all preferences as commensurable and 
substitutable. This is necessary for the exercise of preference aggregation and 
construction of utility functions. Yet, wellbeing is not a simple function of 
aggregated consumption. The standard assumptions underlying the utility 
function – independence of preferences, consistence of choice – are only 
applicable to a  limited scope analysis, but being applied to the totality of 
human desires they trap economic analysis in the maximization paradigm.
Realizing that consumption maximization is not realistically the 
sole drive behind human actions, standard economic models consider 
“preference for leisure” as an element that may limit the relentless pursuit of 
more consumption. But this only applies to individual consumers-workers. 
Capital, on the other hand, knows no leisure and standard economic models 
do not consider constraints for relentless pursuit of return on investment. In 
the following section it will be argued that this is exacerbated by the current 
structure of financial markets and that putting ownership of economic 
organizations exclusively in the hands of investors hardwires the economy 
for excess. 
Dating back to the work of Ronald Coase and still in the modern literature, 
a  firm is a basic unit of economic organization and is conceptualized as 
a nexus of contracts, an entity that facilitates transactions between multiple 
parties. The parties involved may be defined more narrowly, as investors, 
managers and employees, somewhat more broadly, including suppliers and 
customers, or broadly including government and pressure groups.3 Parties 
involved exchange various things – such as labor, financial capital, property 
rights to land and equipment, intermediate products, final products – most 
of which have a  qualitative dimension. To perceive all these objects of 
exchange as qualitatively identical and analyze solely their monetary value 
makes the ecological and social impact of these transactions opaque. Each 
of these groups, has a stake in the firm (thus the term: stakeholders), which 
for most of the groups is not only pecuniary, but real. The real dimension 
of a stake could be, e.g. for employees – employment security or workplace 
relationships, for suppliers – preservation of traditional production 
techniques, for customers – health considerations, for the community – 
impact on the natural environment, etc. Such stakes, of qualitative nature, 
3  R. E. Freeman, J. McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management, Dar-
den Business School Working Paper” 2001, no. 01–02.
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are not subject to the maximization logic, as opposed to the pecuniary 
stake, of quantitative nature. Every transaction represents a particular mix 
of qualitative and quantitative stakes. Clearly, for the investors who are 
not involved in operation of the firm the pecuniary stake is a dominant 
motivation. Thus, putting investors in control of most of the firms, 
subordinates most of the economic activity to the motivation of financial 
profit, the only measure of a  firm’s performance that can be maximized 
infinitely. Unfortunately, its maximization often comes at the expense of 
other measures of qualitative nature.
3. Existing arguments for investor ownership
The notion of ownership of an organization is related to the concept 
of incomplete contracts. It is never possible to contract for every possible 
instance, therefore in any firm some party must have authority to make 
decisions falling out of the scope of contracts. In other words, a  firm is 
a hierarchy, essentially a power structure. The stakeholders of the firm are 
in different power positions within this structure. The holders of ultimate 
control, referred to as residual control in the literature, are deemed the 
owners of the firm.4 Currently great majority of firms are investor-owned, 
even though non-investor enterprises, i.e. cooperatives and non-profit 
organizations, exist and persist.5 There are different varieties of collective 
inverstor ownership, i.e. partnership, limited liability partnership, and most 
importantly corporation, private or publicly listed. As a  rule, the largest 
firms are publicly listed. According to the ownership concept described 
above, in investor-owned companies’ shareholders are owners, i.e. they 
exercise residual control, particularly to achieve appropriate residual profit.
The theory of property rights provides several arguments to explain the 
predominance of investor ownership. One of them refers to homogeneity 
of interests – Hansmann6 suggests that ownership, i.e. exercising residual 
control, is costly in terms of resources engaged to reach decisions by 
a  group of owners and in terms of inferior decisions resulting from 
collective choice problems. He assumes collective choice problems to 
be particularly severe if the owners have heterogeneous interests.7 The 
interests of investors, especially those detached from the operations of an 
enterprise, are generally aligned at maximizing present net value of firm’s 
earnings (leaving aside minor preference differences as to the liquidity and 
4  O. D., Hart, J. Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, “e Journal of 
Political Economy” 1990, no. 98(6), p. 1119–1158.
5  H. Hansmann, e Ownership of Enterprise, Harvard University Press 2000.
6  Ibidem.
7  is should be the main reason why ownership is almost always held by one dis-
tinct group of stakeholders; Hansmann posits that collective decision-making costs 
among parties with adversarial interests would be innite.
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risk). Such high homogeneity of interests among investors greatly reduces 
collective decision making costs for this group of stakeholders. The other 
important argument relates to the fact that together with residual control 
owners also bear the residual risk in the firm. The investors are a group 
well suited for risk bearing because they can diversify risk among many 
investments. Yet, this leads to the dispersion of ownership, which on the 
other hand results in agency problems.
Lazonick and Sullivan8 explain how agency theorists, in the belief 
that market is, as a rule, more efficient than any organization, have built 
a strong normative argument that firms should focus on maximizing sha-
reholder value. According to the authors parallel structural changes in fi-
nancial markets, namely diminishing individual stock ownership and rise 
of institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds, enabled 
emergence of a competitive market for corporate management, which cre-
ated strong incentives for managers to abandon the strategy of reinvesting 
profits in favor of short-term strategies based on downsizing and distribu-
tion of dividends. A current wave of company share buybacks is a pertinent 
example of this.9
The last three decades have seen expansion of the financial sector glob-
ally, increased financial intermediation ratio and growth of institutional 
investors such as pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies.10 
Individual savers have many reasons to cede management over their cap-
ital to such institutions, which achieve great economies of scale and thus 
are able to employ highly qualified experts, operate on international mar-
kets, pay lower commission fees, make large indivisible investments, create 
highly diversified portfolio and engage in securitization. In such a system 
individual shareholders have no relation to the particular firm where their 
capital is invested or even no information about it, not to mention interest 
in its operations. Individuals only judge performance of the fund invest-
ing on their behalf. In other words, financial intermediation obscures most 
of qualitative aspects of the investments and reduces investor behavior to 
narrowly defined rationality. Consequently, institutional investors have 
to compete in offering possibly greatest rates of return. Even if institu-
tional investors may be, for different reasons, induced to do sustainable 
investment, they are under pressure to be competitive with investors that 
do unsustainable investments. What is more, institutional investors behave 
8  Lazonick W., O’Sullivan M., Maximizing shareholder value: a  new ideology for 
corporate governance, “Economy and Society” 2000, 29(1), p. 13–35.
9  W. Lazonick, Prots without prosperity, “Harvard Business Review”, Septem-
ber 2014, https://hbr.org/2014/09/prots-without-prosperity (18.04.2015); e repur-
chase revolution, “e Economist”, 13th September 2014, http://www.economist.com/
node/21616968/print (21.04.2015).
10  E. P. Davis, B. Steil, Institutional investors, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 
London 2004.
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much differently than individual investors, e.g. they are less risk averse11, 
which significantly alters the dynamics in the financial markets. Nominal 
owners have a share but do not have a stake in firm’s operations, therefore 
are oblivious to all other variables than financial return on equity. Investor 
ownership intermediated by the financial markets in their current shape 
strips ownership of the “husbandry” approach and holistic view of the or-
ganization and its relations to the society and to the natural environment. 
Such a system inevitably renders the economic organizations hard-wired 
for relentless maximization of financial profit, which originally was only 
supposed to be the means, not end goal for human wellbeing and resource 
preservation.
In the two sections so far I have argued that while sustainable economy 
can only be based on concern for the qualitative dimensions of human life, 
work and environment, yet the standard economic theorizing employ ma-
ximization principle and focus on quantitative analysis. Prevalence of inve-
stor ownership should be seen as a product of economic theorizing based 
on maximization principle. Moreover, intermediation of financial markets 
eliminates qualitative considerations by investors. For this reason, putting 
control over economic organizations in the hands of investors, interme-
diated by financial markets in their current form, directs their operations 
inevitably towards profit maximization.
4. Non-investor-owned enterprises: cooperatives, non-profits
In this section I will present alternative forms of ownership and delibe-
rate their relevance to the concept of economics of moderation.
An alternative to inverstor ownership is the assignment of residual con-
trol to a different group of stakeholders than investors. Such arrangement 
is not hypothetical – it can be observed in the worker-owned cooperatives, 
producer-owned cooperatives, consumer-owned cooperatives, as well as 
non-profit associations and foundations.12 This typology, based on Hans-
mann13, distinguishes organization type according to the stakeholders 
group that is in control.14 It is consistent with the apparent regularity that 
ownership rarely or never occurs in mixed groups of different stakeholders. 
According to the author, the phenomenon is explained by heterogeneity of 
interests of different stakeholders. In other words, this typology is based on 
11  M. Aglietta, Shareholder value and corporate governance: some tricky ques-
tions, “Economy and Society” 2000, no. 29(1), p. 146–159.
12  Non-prot organizations restrict the owner’s right to appropriate residual prot. 
e owners of such organizations can enjoy various rights, yet the most important one 
characteristic of investor ownership – pursuit ofreturn on investment – is ruled out.
13  H. Hansmann, e Ownership of Enterprise, Harvard University Press 2000.
14  In fact, Hansmann argues that an investor-owned company is nothing more than 
an investor-owned cooperative.
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the premise that the legal owners should have interests that are roughly ali-
gned with the organization, otherwise it is impossible to sensibly control it.
It is worth noting, that there exists a parallel strand of theorizing, root-
ed in sociology and social psychology, namely the open systems theory 
of organization. Its foundations have been laid by Katz and Kahn.15 This 
perspective sees organization as a  social phenomenon and generally ab-
stracts from power or control considerations; it is proposed that because 
an organization is dependent on the environment to get the inputs and sell 
the output, therefore it needs to balance all actions to maintain support of 
all the engaged groups. For this reason no single group is more important 
than another. In this view, either all stakeholders are owners or ownership 
doesn’t matter.16 The open systems theory was one of the main inspirations 
behind the stakeholder approach, as developed in the management litera-
ture. In the stakeholder approach the managers have fiduciary responsibil-
ity to all stakeholders.17 However, the economic literature is dominated by 
the rationalist approach.
The first category of the typology by Hansmann18 encompasses 
ownership by groups that contribute inputs other than capital, such as 
labor (worker-ownership) or intermediate goods (supplier cooperatives). 
Worker-ownership’s main characteristic is that ownership is bound with 
employment contract, what eliminates the employer-employee power 
and information asymmetry. Consequently, the worker-owners are 
concerned with qualitative aspects of employment in the firm. A supplier-
or producer-cooperative usually involves hired labor and its objective is 
shifting bargaining power or part of buyer’s fees to the suppliers. It is not 
a given that the owners in this model are concerned with non-pecuniary 
production aspects. 
The second category encompasses ownership by consumers of the 
outputs, e.g. retail, wholesale or housing cooperatives, as well as communal 
utilities. One may object that communal utilities are closer to the state-
owned enterprises than consumer cooperatives. Indeed, this is the special 
case where the stakeholder group has means to coerce all its members to 
participate, which is not true for retail or housing cooperatives. However, 
this does not change the nature of the argument – the owners, whether 
voluntary or not – have interest in the qualitative dimension of the firm’s 
production, not solely in its profit.
15  D. Katz, R. L. Kahn, e social psychology of organizations, Wiley, New York 1978.
16  J. A. Andersen, Reintroducing the Owner: On Corporate Governance, Goals, Or-
ganization and Leadership eories, in: Proceedings of the 8th European Conference on 
Management, Leadership and Governance, J. Politis (eds.), Academic Conferences In-
ternational Limited, 2012, p. 1–7.
17  R. E. Freeman, J. McVea, A  Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management,” 
Darden Business School Working Paper” 2001, no. 01–02.
18  H. Hansmann, e Ownership of Enterprise, Harvard University Press 2000.
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The last category encompasses all organizations, in which the owner’s 
right to withdraw residual profits is limited, i.e. non-profit associations 
and foundations. However, the non-distribution criterion proposed by 
Hansmann turns out to be quite imprecise. Certainly, it is not a universal 
criterion, when one takes national legal particularities into account. The 
author considers organizations specified as tax exempt under US federal 
tax code, but there are certainly other organizations bound by non- 
-distribution constraint and the delineation may differ across countries. As 
pointed out by e.g. Steinberg19, labor unions, political parties, trade and 
civic associations, professional sports leagues, and governments themselves 
are all barred from distribution of profits. This only turns our attention to 
the fact that all organizations are “economical”, in a sense that they partake 
in resource allocation process.
Similarly, once we accept that ownership belongs to only one particular 
group of stakeholders, there is no fundamental difference in the internal 
democratic mechanisms between investor- and non-investor-owned firms 
– the decisions are taken by some preference aggregation procedure among 
the owners. The key feature distinguishing broadly defined cooperatives 
and non-profit organizations and conventional firms is the engagement 
of owners in the operations of the firm. In all the above-mentioned 
organization types the owners have non-pecuniary stakes in their firms, 
i.e. other considerations regarding its operations besides financial profit 
or loss.
5. Advantages of non-investor owned enterprises  
with regard to curbing excess
This section provides a very brief account of stylized facts about non- 
-investor owned enterprises supporting the claim that they pursue multidi-
mensional goals instead of single maximand expressed in financial terms.
Both cooperatives and non-profit organizations can be and were indeed 
analyzed in the standard economics framework, i.e. with the assumption 
of a  single maximand. In his much cited work, Ward20 applied marginal 
analysis to develop a model of a worker-owned cooperative maximizing in-
come-per-worker. The model results in ‘perverse supply response’21, which 
received much curiosity and prompted further elaboration on the model 
19  R. Steinberg, Economic theories of nonprot organizations, in: e study of the 
nonprot enterprise, H. K. Anheier, A. Ben-Ner, (eds.), Springer Science+Business Me-
dia New York 2003, p. 277–309.
20  B. Ward, e rm in Illyria: market syndicalism, “e American Economic Re-
view” 1958, vol. 48, no. 4, p. 566–589.
21  I.e. in order to maximize income per worker, a cooperative should increase em-
ployment and output with the fall of demand and decrease employment and output 
with the rise of demand.
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by Domar22 and Vanek23, who partly refuted Wards claims. Furubotn24 and 
Pejovich25 proposed a broader view on individual maximization within la-
bor managed firm to suggest that one can expect the majority to strive to 
secure gains for labor, which leads to inefficiency, and that worker-owners 
fail to accumulate capital within enterprise or disregard maintenance of its 
capital assets. 
Yet, the results of empirical research seem to be at odds with assertions 
of the theorists. Ward’s sloped supply curve is not observed and the gen-
eral assumption that the worker-owners’ dividend should be considered 
as a maximand is rejected.26 This shows how inappropriate the reduction-
ist approach is to any organization with real social dynamics. Ward’s mis-
take was to believe that cooperatives would flexibly adjust employment to 
maximize dividend; in reality, firing decisions are much more disruptive to 
a collective of co-workers than payroll adjustments. Various studies con-
firm that worker-owned enterprises adjust wages or working time instead 
of workforce size.27 In other words, worker-owners consider qualitative di-
mensions of the firm operations, such as employment stability and work-
place relations, more than investor-owners. 
Some evidence suggests that cooperatives have a useful role in combat-
ing unemployment.28 In adverse economic conditions, when conventional 
firms tend not to enter market, the cooperatives are formed. Interestingly, 
once formed, they have good survival rates – in fact, more cooperatives 
survive than conventional companies.29 In all, they exhibit resilience and 
dynamics very much different to the volatility observed in an environment 
populated by investor-driven enterprises.
At the same time, counter to the suggestions that worker-owned coop-
eratives provide poor work incentives, researchers find them equally effi-
22  E. D. Domar, e Soviet collective farm as a producer cooperative, “e American 
Economic Review” 1966, vol. 56, no. 4, part 1, p. 734–757.
23  J. Vanek, Decentralization under workers’ management: A  theoretical appraisal, 
“e American Economic Review” 1969, vol. 59, issue 5, p. 1006–1014.
24  E. G. Furubotn, e long-run analysis of the labor-managed rm: An alternative 
interpretation, “e American Economic Review” 1976, vol. 66, issue 1, p. 104–123.
25  S. Pejovich, Why has the labor-managed rm failed, “Cato Journal” 1992, no. 12, 
p. 461.
26  J. P. Bonin, D. C. Jones, L. Putterman, eoretical and empirical studies of producer 
cooperatives: will ever the twain meet?, “Journal of Economic Literature” 1993, vol. 31, 
no. 3, p. 1290–1320.
27  Ibidem.
28  P. Kalmi, Catching a wave: the formation of co-operatives in Finnish regions, “Small 
Business Economics” 2013, no. 41(1), p. 295–313.
29  A. Ben-Ner, Comparative empirical observations on worker-owned and capitalist 
rms, “International Journal of Industrial Organization” 1988, no. 6, p. 7–31; V. Péro-
tin, Entry, exit, and the business cycle: Are cooperatives dierent?, “Journal of Compara-
tive Economics” 2004, no. 34(2), p. 295–316.
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cient as conventional firms.30 Shirking turns out not to be pervasive. This 
can be explained with psychological factors at play, such as identification 
with the firm, reputation among the peers, pride from work. This again 
underlines the importance of qualitative considerations. 
At this point it should be mentioned that for many people the impor-
tant feature of the cooperatives is that they prevent alienation of work.31 
Similarly, workplace democracy can be considered as a value of its own.32 
These statements sit well together with the argument proposed here that 
there is a number of values that people strive to realize simultaneously and 
that reduction of economic analysis to monetary value is unhelpful, if not 
counterproductive.
As mentioned before, worker-owned cooperatives are only one special 
case of this organization form. The consumer- and supplier-owned coop-
eratives, where the owners are not directly involved in firm’s operations, 
but do benefit from it financially, may put the argument that non-investor 
ownership should be linked to qualitative considerations in question. Un-
fortunately, the literature often confounds different kinds of cooperatives. 
Otherwise, most research has been done on agricultural producer coop-
eratives, but its method and focus have little relevance for the argument 
proposed here. The dedicated research would be needed to make founded 
claims that consumer and supplier cooperatives pursue more than one-di-
mensional financial objective. Yet, there is some evidence on the behavior 
of another special form of cooperative enterprise – the cooperative bank, 
which cannot easily be categorized either as a consumer or supplier coop-
erative. Even though owner-members’ interests are purely pecuniary, there 
is still a pronounced difference compared to investor-owned banks, name-
ly that cooperative banks prove much more resilient in times of crisis.33 
In other words, cooperative banks are characterized by stability, a quality 
which can hardly be associated with investor-owned banks, which can be 
deemed main drivers of volatility in the contemporary financial sector.
Perhaps most interestingly, non-profit organizations have non-pecunia-
ry objectives indicated in their statutory documents. It should be also noted 
that laws regulating this form of organization usually indicate the general 
public benefit purposes it may serve. And yet, there is also fair amount of 
literature on the question of “what do non-profits maximize”? In his ma-
30  B. Craig, J. Pencavel, A Participation and productivity : A comparison of worker 
cooperatives and conventional rms in the plywood industry, “Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity: Microeconomics” 1995, p. 121–174.
31  M. J. Wells, Alienation, work structure, and the quality of life: Can cooperatives 
make a dierence?, “Social Problems” 1981, no. 28(5), p. 548–562.
32  J. Vanek, Decentralization under workers’ management: A  theoretical appraisal, 
“e American Economic Review” 1969, vol. 59, issue 5, p. 1006–1014.
33  J. Birchall, L. H. Ketilson, Resilience of the cooperative business model in times 
of crisis, International Labour Organization, Geneva 2009.
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jor contribution to the topic, Steinberg34 hypothesized that non-profits fall 
either in “service maximization” or “budget maximization” category. Put-
ting his hypothesis to the test, he found differences with regard to industry 
sector: arts, education and social welfare organizations maximized servi-
ce, while health organizations maximized budget. Further studies result 
in more confusion: Horwitz and Nichols35 find that non-profit hospitals 
maximize service, Deneffe and Masson36 suggest that they regard service 
and ‘profit’ (payments to the agents in control) at the same time. Brooks37 
hints that non-profit organizations may maximize service quality or other 
qualitative aspect of their mission, but dismisses this notion in favor of Ste-
inberg’s proposition, even though his test of a model based on this propo-
sition is inconclusive. The inconclusiveness of the debate, or the complexity 
of the issue, seems to be in line with the argument that a non-profit, being 
a non-investor owned enterprise, faces dilemmas between different objec-
tives, which by definition excludes maximization of just one. The evidence 
cited, in fact, does not rule out that neither output nor size – the quantita-
tive dimensions of organizational performance – are maximized. Whether 
the objectives of an organization are virtuous or not and whether the cho-
ices are made wisely is a different matter.
6. Conclusion
This paper explored the idea of non-investor owned firms. The main 
argument is that while investors, in particular portfolio investors, have 
little or no concern for qualitative aspects of a firm’s performance, owners 
that are not investors do. Non-investor owned firms are conceptualized as 
organizations where the right to residual control is assigned to a group of 
stakeholders other than investors, such as workers, suppliers or consumers, 
or where the right to distribute residual profit is not present, as in non-
profit organizations. The argument is supported by reference to a selection 
of relevant empirical studies.
34  R. Steinberg, e revealed objective functions of nonprot rms, “e RAND Jour-
nal of Economics” 1986, p. 508–526.
35  J. R. Horwitz, Nichols A., What do nonprots maximize? Nonprot hospital service 
provision and market ownership mix, National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Papers 2007, no. 13246.
36  D. Denee, R. T. Masson, What do not-for-prot hospitals maximize?, “Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization” 2002, no. 20(4), p. 461–492.
37  A. C. Brooks, What do nonprot organizations seek? (And why should policymakers 
care?), “Journal of Policy Analysis and Management”, 2005, no. 24(3), p. 543–558.
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Economic Organization Forms Beyond Investor-Ownership
Abstract
It is argued that the maximization logic, on which classic economic analysis is based 
disregards the multidimensionality of human desires. erefore, the arguments for su-
periority of inverstor ownership, which are based on the maximization logic, are mis-
placed. Indeed, promising features can be observed among the existing non-investor 
owned organizations.
Keywords: heterodox economics, ownership, rm objectives, cooperatives, non-prots
Formy organizacyjne przedsiębiorstw inne niż własność inwestorska
Streszczenie 
Klasyczna analiza ekonomiczna ignoruje w swojej logice maksymalizacji wieloaspek-
towość ludzkich pragnień. Argumentacja na rzecz wyższości własności inwestorskiej, 
stanowiąca element klasycznej logiki maksymalizacji, pozostaje zatem zachwiana 
i niedoskonała. Obserwacja rzeczywistości gospodarczej pozwala na zidentykowanie 
szeregu cech organizacji nie należących do inwestorów, które ukrywają w sobie duży 
potencjał analityczny.
Słowa kluczowe: ekonomia heterodoksyjna, własność, cele rmy, współpracownicy, 
brak nastawienia na zysk
